

Study of the Conceptual Model of Intelligence Coordination in Indonesia Using SSM

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Article Info

Article history:

Received 1 September 2025

Received in revised form 12

February 2026

Accepted 9 March 2026

Keywords:

Coordination

Conceptual Model

Intelligence Community

Indonesia

SSM

Abstract

Coordination of state intelligence is one source of problems which also widens the spectrum of national threats in Indonesia. Errors in how to act in reducing threats, data errors, and the inability of the Intelligence Community (IC) to collectively read symptoms, are forms of intelligence failure as an early warning and early detection country. The threat dynamics also continue to develop, now they are no longer traditional (military) but even non-military hybrid, requiring the IC to improve the coordination system and share information with each other. The two main causes and interplay between ambiguous policies and high levels of institutional ego among IC members, lead to competition because each IC member reports directly so that the President assesses them as more active and productive (the single user of intelligence). Such conditions make it difficult for the President to assess analysis bias, data accuracy and the effectiveness of suggestions from the amount of information received. This study presents an illustration of the conceptual model of the state intelligence coordination system in Indonesia, using a qualitative approach with the instrument of the Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) to overcome problems in complex coordination systems (messy situations) and involving many actors with goals that are not always the same. PQR analysis, CATWOE and 3E are used in an action-oriented inquiry process to change, improve, and perfect the problematic situation of the selected system. This study produces a conceptual model that can be used as material for discussion and debate in determining purposeful activity, especially on four problems; negative stigma about sharing information, reporting dualism, membership ambiguity, and low compliance. The chosen fourth root definitions lead to transformation in the form of policy changes that emphasize the importance of sharing information, clarity of the reporting system, membership structure, and the obligation to carry out the IC coordinator's recommendations.

Introduction

After 12 years of implementation, state intelligence coordination in Indonesia is still hampered by high levels of institutional ego and competition among members of the intelligence community. The level of effectiveness of the information exchange has been carried out by the Intelligence Community (IC) at the provincial level in 2022 at a score of 81.24, while at the central level, there is no definite measure. The compliance level of IC members in carrying out orders/recommendations from the IC coordinator is 90.22% (Badan Intelijen Negara, 2022).

IC coordination activities are mandated through Law Number 17 of 2011 concerning State Intelligence, with the aim of making the state able to ward off all forms of strategic threats and surprises that endanger the existence and integrity of the state, through early detection and early warning of developments in strategic environmental conditions. As a complement to the

implementing regulations, Presidential Regulation Number 67 of 2013 and Regulations of the Head of the State Intelligence Agency Number 01 of 2014 regulate more technically the form of coordination through the Central Intelligence Committee (Kominpus) and the Regional Intelligence Committee (Kominda) (Wicaksana et al., 2025; Mulya et al., 2023; Amran, 2024).

The policy explains the importance of coordination carried out by the IC with its membership, namely The Head of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN) as the IC coordinator, and members of the IC who are tiered down to the regional level consist of the Head of Intelligence for the Republic of Indonesia Police, Intelligence Assistant to the Commander of the Indonesian National Army, Head of Intelligence for the Indonesian National Army, Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence, Director General for National Unity and Politics, Ministry of Home Affairs, Director General of Information and Public Diplomacy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Coordinator for Domestic Politics, Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Law and Security, Director General of Defense Strategy, Ministry of Defense, Director General of Customs and Excise, Ministry of Finance, Director General Immigration, Ministry of Law and Human Rights, as well as intelligence organizers in other ministries/agencies.

BIN is mandated to act as IC coordinator, whose duties are: (1) coordinating the implementation of state intelligence; (2) integrating intelligence products; (3) report on the implementation of state intelligence coordination to the President; and (4) organize and coordinate national leadership security intelligence.

In reality, coordination is not always successful or effective. The problem most often felt by its members is that the IC works separately and does not share information with each other, this is because each information has a different level of classification, which ultimately encourages restrictions on access rights, and this increases distrust both parties (Trim, 2001; Garicano & Posner, 2005; Awan et al., 2023; Manfredi & Capik, 2022). ICs who share information with each other also measure the benefits and risks of possible distortion of the information shared. Therefore, ICs need to mitigate risk by building a hierarchy into information sharing agreements that allows each IC to carry out more Bass effective oversight (Walsh, 2007). This problem has an impact on the weakness of intelligence capabilities to prevent and anticipate threats. It is only by sharing information and resources, or producing them collectively, that complex threats can be predicted, analyzed and managed successfully (Fägersten, 2014; Jesus et al., 2023; Bass et al., 2025; Saeed et al., 2023; Safitra et al., 2023; Mai et al., 2024).

In order to explore more deeply and fully understand the problem situation, Analysis One, Two and Three was carried out (Checkland, 2007; Zhang & Tur, 2024; Zhang & Ma, 2023). Analysis One, Two and Three are investigations carried out to find out about problematic situations before creating a Rich Picture (Checkland & Scholes, 1990), where each focuses on intervention on problems of concern, socio-cultural system analysis, and political analysis.

At the Analysis stage One, there are three people or groups of people who need to be listed in order to understand how the system operates, called the CPO, namely the Client (who caused the intervention), the Practitioner (who is conducting the investigation and learning simultaneously), and the Owner of the issues addressed (those considered concerned or affected). Analysis Two consists of three elements, namely Roles, Norms, and Values, in fact none of these elements are static. Analysis Three focuses on the disposition of power in a situation and the process of containing it (Checkland, P. & Poulter, J., 2020; Friend & Kimpton-Nye, 2023; Turner et al., 2023; Xu et al., 2022; Turner et al., 2023).

From the process of identifying and analyzing one, two and three problems in a series of interrelated subsystems and the individual learning process, problematic situations are outlined in a more structured way in a rich picture.




Figure 1. Rich Picture: the current state of the intelligence coordination system in Indonesia

Methods

This study presents an illustration of a conceptual model of the state intelligence coordination system in Indonesia, using a qualitative approach that provides the freedom to look at social phenomena holistically (Creswell, 2009), with the Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) instrument.

SSM is an approach used to overcome problems in complicated situations (messy situations). SSM is an action-oriented investigation process into problematic situations from real everyday life (Checkland & Poulter in Hardjosoekarto, 2012: 17), which is based on social learning, improvement, and purposeful activity (Checkland & Poulter, 2020: 202). SSM was born in response to usage failures and hard systems methodology in solving social problems, but not as an alternative but a complement that helps understand the world holistically (Kane and Del Mistro, 2003).

The basic idea of SSM departs from real world situations which are Human Activity Systems (HAS), researchers can choose which systems have relevance to compare and discuss with the real world (Hardjosoekarto, 2012; Phalp & Milani, 2022). In SSM the learning process occurs when real situations are explored in an organized manner using intellect, thus allowing for directed discussions based on activity models prepared from various stakeholder points of view (worldviews).

HAS can be understood from the concept of human identity which always attaches meaning to what they see and experience. In other words, humans feel they cannot stand facing the absence of meaning. On this basis, humans can develop the will to decide or do something. The real world experienced when constructed using SSM becomes a very complex and mysterious relationship of human activities, the number of which is infinite, but connected to one another (De Levita, 2019; Frie, 2003; Levinas, 1987). HAS can be selected from one or several relevant human activity systems, which are then discussed with at (purposeful activities) which will then become the basis for taking action steps in the real world (Hardjosoekarto, 2012; Perkwitz et al., 2004), so that the cognitive abilities of system actors become important in finding research and action results.

The SSM process takes the form of a learning cycle that starts from finding out about problematic situations to defining/taking action to improve them. The SSM cycle consists of four types of activities, namely (1) finding out the initial situation that is considered problematic; (2) create several activity models that have objectives that are considered relevant to the situation; (3) using the model to question the actual situation; and (4) determine/take action to improve the situation.

Despite Jackson's criticism (1991, in Basden & Harper, 2006), which says that SSM is less useful in situations of conflict and unequal distribution, making it impossible to carry out open debate to find the desired solution, however as SSM users become more sophisticated, this process is not the only reference that must be followed, but rather a model that makes sense when negotiating to resolve problems (Checkland & Poulter, 2020: 216-217).

This research focuses on CATWOE analysis (Customers, Actors, Transformation, Worldview (Weltanschauung), Owners, and Environmental Constraints), as an SSM modeling technique. The CATWOE analysis framework is a memory aid (mnemonic) that provides an overview of the root definition of a system chosen to analyze the transformation process.

This guide is used as a basis for asking questions about real-world situations. Stage 1 explains that doing P, with Q (transformation process), will help achieve R (PQR formula), where PQR answers the questions of 'what', 'how', and 'why'. Stage 2, once the PQR formula is known, it will allow the Root Definition (RD) to be written as a statement. For simplicity, we can use the formula Need X ---T---> Need Met (Basden & Harper, 2006).

Entering stage 3, CATWOE is used to express purposeful activity, which is determined by the transformation process and worldview (T and W). That people (A) are required to carry out activities that form T, influence people outside themselves (C) who become beneficiaries or victims, receive various constraints from the environment outside themselves (E), and can be stopped or changed by several people (O) (Checkland & Poulter, 2020:228-231).

Customers are individuals or groups who receive and experience changes/improvements to Indonesia's national intelligence coordination system. Actors are individuals or groups who take action to create a faster and more integrated IC. Transformation identifies the changes that have been made to Indonesia's national intelligence coordination system, both concrete and abstract. Worldview (Weltanschauung) describes the perspective that explains why the transformation is necessary and has meaningful meaning within its context. Ownership identifies the person or group of people who have power over the system and the authority to complete the transformation. Environmental Constraints describe the environment that hinders the transformation process of the national intelligence coordination system.

CATWOE analysis is used to enrich the formulation root definition which will be used in preparing a conceptual model of the state intelligence coordination system. After the RD has been successfully determined to be proposed as the desired change, a conceptual model is created from it which will be used in the comparison stage (Basden & Harper, 2006). Testing of CATWOE reliability is carried out using system performance measurement criteria including: Efficacy, Efficiency, Effectiveness (3E).

Efficacy is a criterion that explains whether the transformation process of the purposeful activity system can be implemented to achieve the desired results. Efficiency is a criterion for whether transformation can be carried out with minimal use of resources. Effectiveness explains the criteria for whether the transformation can help achieve higher level goals (Hardjosoekarto, 2012).

Data collection was conducted between April 2024 and June 2025, using two primary techniques. In-depth interviews with 20 key informants, consisting of intelligence officials and practitioners from various institutions, included eight informants from intelligence agencies, two informants from the police, three active military personnel, one civil servant from the Ministry of Home Affairs, three academics, and three representatives from non-state actors (non-governmental organizations and the private sector) familiar with intelligence issues and implementing mechanisms. All purposively selected members of the intelligence community were directly involved in intelligence planning, collection, analysis, counterintelligence operations, and product formulation. Interviews lasted an average of 90 minutes, and were preceded by a consent procedure and anonymity guarantees to protect participants' identities. Source triangulation was conducted by comparing informants' statements with other sources, such as those of other informants, applicable mechanisms/regulations in Indonesia, formal documents, online/social media, and previous research. Document analysis was conducted by examining materials related to the Indonesian intelligence workflow, both classified documents provided by informants and publicly accessible sources. Data analysis was conducted thematically and comparatively. This process involved three main stages: (1) Data reduction, filtering relevant information from interviews and documents, (2) Thematic categorization, by grouping data based on dimensions and important elements of the intelligence system, (3) Model reconstruction, compiling a new model based on empirical findings and theories that have been critically analyzed.

Results and Discussion

Initial information obtained in activity I (finding out the initial situation that is considered problematic).

Root Definition (RD)

In the context of the state intelligence coordination system, this study groups real world into 4 (four) RDs with the following analysis of the transformation process:

Table 1. RD naming

RDs Name	Activity	Code
Negative stigma about sharing information	A system owned and operated by the IC in order to prevent secret intelligence leaks (P), through consensus on the redefinition of intelligence secrets, levels of information classification, restrictions on access rights, and sanctions for negligence in the event of information leaks, or form a new, more trusted institution (Q) to ensure that there are no leaks in information sharing activities, as well as building mutual trust among IC members (R).	RD 1
Reporting Dualism	A system owned and operated by the IC in order to reorganize the IC structure and information flow that regulates the reporting system in a tiered and integrated manner (P), through the revision of Presidential Regulation Number 67 of 2013 concerning State Intelligence Coordination, by adding a clause regarding the obligation to submit intelligence reports to BIN as coordinator, to be processed and produced into intelligence that is submitted to the President through BIN (Q) to eliminate competition between IC members with integrated intelligence reporting (R).	RD 2

RDs Name	Activity	Code
Member Ambiguity	A system owned and operated by IC in order to determine the composition of IC membership at both central and regional levels (P), through the decision of the Head of BIN regarding permanent and non-permanent members every year, or updated with a change of official (Q) to eliminate membership ambiguity and foster responsibility from each IC member (R).	RD 3
Low Compliance	A system owned and operated by the IC in order to increase compliance with the implementation of the IC coordinator's recommendations (P), through the revision of Presidential Regulation Number 67 of 2013 concerning State Intelligence Coordination, by adding a clause regarding implementation reward and punishment to all IC members, or regulate the height of the rank of IC members based on the order of seniority (Q) to carry out the policy mandates of IC members to the IC coordinator (R).	RD 4

The four root definitions that were successfully agreed upon include: Negative stigma about sharing information, Reporting Dualism, Member Ambiguity, and Low Compliance. These four problems are identified based on the definition of the system and its current conditions, the transformation process, and the changes that are to be achieved.

Table 2. CATWOE and 3E analysis on RD 1: Negative Stigma

Customers	Coordinator of IC
Actors	Coordinator of IC Members of IC
Transformation	Consensus documents, or form a new, more trusted institution: from non-existence to existence
Worldview	Redefinition of intelligence secrets, levels of information classification, restrictions on access rights, and sanctions for negligence are critical to removing the stigma that sharing information is the same as leaking information
Owners	Coordinator of IC Members of IC
Environmental Constraints	Culture of seniority, militaristic style, institutional ego and political interests
Efficacy	Consensus is accepted and implemented by IC members with the same goals
Efficiency	Using minimum resources (technology and time)
Effectiveness	The realization of intelligence fusion

The transformation required from RD 1 is to re-equalize the definition of confidentiality among IC members which has so far been interpreted differently. This requires a consensus on what should be shared whether from suspicions, data, information or semi-intelligence products, whether classified as 'normal', 'secret' or 'top secret'. Consensus also determines the value of information based on an assessment balance, which describes trust in the source of information and the truth of the information content. After this basic agreement has been reached, IC members need to design mechanisms and means of exchanging information as well as standard information security methods in each agency. Recognizing the value of information by using

source references in the use of information, and agreeing on sanctions if secret intelligence is leaked.

Obstacles of the transformation may come from IC coordinators and IC members who reject these agreements, due to a culture of seniority among IC leaders, a hierarchical militaristic style, high institutional ego which considers its agency to be the most important and needed by the president, as well as differences in political views. controlling one or several agencies because they are affiliated with political parties and power.

Table 3. CATWOE and 3E analysis on RD 2

Customers	President of the Republic of Indonesia
Actors	Coordinator of IC Members of IC
Transformation	Addition of several clauses to Presidential Regulation Number 67 of 2013 concerning State Intelligence Coordination regarding the obligation to submit information to BIN as coordinator, to be processed and produced into intelligence which is submitted to the President through BIN: from non-existent to existing
Worldview	Tiered and integrated intelligence reporting is very important to reduce bounded rationality policy makers
Owners	President of the Republic of Indonesia Coordinator of IC IC members
Environmental Constraints	Demands for speed of reporting, institutional egos and political dynamics
Efficacy	The existence of formal laws regarding 'who reports to whom'
Efficiency	Using minimum resources (cost and HR)
Effectiveness	Realization of rational policies

The transformation required from RD 2 is a change in policy regarding state intelligence coordination by adding a clause regarding the obligation to submit information to the IC coordinator, to be processed and produced into intelligence, and a single door for delivery to the President through IC coordination.

Obstacles to transformation may come from the President, IC coordinator or IC members who refuse to add this article, due to demands for speed in submitting reports, because the tiered analysis process takes longer, institutional ego because they want to be seen as more productive than other IC members, and the existence of political dynamics.

Table 4. CATWOE and 3E analysis on RD 3

Customers	Coordinator of IC IC members
Actors	Coordinator of IC
Transformation	BIN Head's decision about permanent and non-permanent members: from nothing to existence
Worldview	Certainty of IC membership is very important to foster awareness and responsibility of IC members
Owners	Coordinator of IC
Environmental Constraints	Political interests (highly turnover position in political office)
Efficacy	The existence of formal law in the structure, duties and responsibilities of the IC

Efficiency	Using minimum resources (cost, time, technology, information and human resources)
Effectiveness	Coordination runs with clear membership, structure, duties and responsibilities

The transformation required from RD 3 is the IC coordinator's decision regarding permanent and non-permanent members. Permanent member status is given to agencies mandated in higher regulations (in this case Republic of Indonesia Presidential Regulation Number 67 of 2013), these members do not change under any conditions and level of threat.

This membership structure can be clarified by not only appointing a chairman, secretary and members, but also information specialization for clear delegation of tasks and avoiding overlapping information, such as the Head of Immigration to supply information about the arrival and departure of operational targets, so that no other agency provides information. other than what is required.

Meanwhile, non-permanent members are government agencies or other parties that are intensely involved in certain threats, such as the Ministry of Health and the Health Service which are part of medical intelligence operations in building herd immunity during COVID-19.

Obstacles to transformation may come from coordinators who feel preoccupied with administrative matters in changing membership decisions, which are carried out repeatedly every time there is a change in position for an IC member.

Table 5. CATWOE and 3E analysis on RD 4: Low Compliance

Customers	President of the Republic of Indonesia
Actors	Coordinator of IC IC members
Transformation	Added clause in Presidential Regulation Number 67 of 2013 concerning State Intelligence Coordination regarding implementation reward and punishment to all IC members, or regulate the height of the rank of IC members based on the order of seniority: from non-existence to existence
Worldview	Application Reward and punishment It is very important to build the enthusiasm of IC members to carry out all the recommendations of the IC coordinator
Owners	Members of IC
Environmental Constraints	Culture of seniority, militaristic style, institutional ego and political interests
Efficacy	Compliance performance measurement procedures for completing recommendations
Efficiency	Uses minimum resources (cost)
Effectiveness	Increase compliance with the implementation of IC coordinator recommendations

The transformation required from RD 4 is the addition of a clause in Presidential Regulation Number 67 of 2013 regarding the implementation of the reward and punishment system in compliance with the completion of orders or recommendations from the IC coordinator to IC members.

Obstacles to transformation may come from IC members who refuse to add this article, due to a reluctance to be regulated and governed by someone other than the President, or a younger

IC coordinator with a lower rank, or the loyalty factor of only obeying their immediate superior compared to cross-level leaders agency.

Conceptual Model

Figure 2 explains the conceptual model developed in this research. The conceptual model is a description of the researcher's way of thinking based on RD (Hardjosoekarto, 2012: 101). The conceptual model in Figure 2 is used as an intellectual tool in conducting discussions, debates and dialogue to open up other points of view to seek ideas for changes/improvements in the state intelligence coordination system.

In this stage, researchers build a model based on applicable regulations regarding state intelligence coordination. The conceptual model was built in an integrated and holistic manner from all RDs, because they have similar activities in the transformation process, with the same goal, namely changing policies regarding state intelligence coordination.




Figure 2. Alternative Conceptual Model 1

Figure 2 explains alternative 1 which can be used in solving problems in the state intelligence coordination system. It starts with evaluating whether the policy objectives have been realized, explaining what indicators prove success, then separating which goals have been fully realized, partially realized, and not yet realized. This needs to be done to determine the scope for formulating new policies.

The IC coordinator, IC members and stakeholders need to jointly redefine what is meant by secret intelligence, what the classification levels are, how to secure the information exchange process, and agree on what sanctions to apply if information leaks occur. This needs to be done in order to clarify the mechanisms and types of information that must be shared and what information does not need to be shared, apart from that it also aims to build trust between IC members in the process of sharing information with each other.

The next stage is to prepare a draft policy change by adding articles regarding the obligation of IC members to submit reports to the IC coordinator and how to implement a reward and punishment system for completing orders or recommendations from the IC coordinator. These

two clauses aim to eliminate the dualistic nature of reporting that has occurred so far. Organizing workshops related to changes to regulations to obtain input from stakeholders, in this case including representatives of the President's office, regional government heads, and the community. The process continues by formally proposing draft policy changes through the applicable legislative drafting system.

In parallel, a new structure, duties and responsibilities of IC membership can be established that are clearer and binding in the decisions of the IC coordinator. This is important to do so that institutional egos do not occur due to the seniority of institutional and organizational leaders who are considered more important by the President. Establishing performance measurement tools for compliance with the completion of orders or recommendations of the IC coordinator is important in implementing a reward and punishment system that is fair and transparent and mutually agreed upon with all IC members.

To ensure continuous learning occurs from system improvements, monitoring stages 1-9 are carried out using the 3E criteria, then taking necessary action to improve the current system.




Figure 3. Alternative Conceptual Model 2

Figure 3 explains alternative 2 which is still preceded by an evaluation of the achievement of policy objectives, then changing the policy by adding a new article regarding the existence of a new institution that is more trusted as the IC coordinator, such as the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in the USA. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act has designated the IC chief executive as advisor to the president, tasked with directing and overseeing the National Intelligence Program (NIP). All IC members report directly to the DNI and produce the President's Daily Brief (PDB), a product processed from all information obtained by IC members, submitted every morning to the president of the USA. This concept can be applied starting with determining the objectives of intelligence collection and analysis, establishing policies for sharing information with foreign intelligence and even

recommendations for the recruitment and dismissal of intelligence officials. The DNI is also responsible for reporting violations committed by IC members.




Figure 4. Alternative Conceptual Model 3

Figure 4 explains alternative 3 which allows the arrangement of intelligence officials as IC members based on higher rank and seniority. This is intended to prevent the view that higher ranks are ruled by lower ranks. The militaristic uniqueness inherent in civilian intelligence organizations can be easily broken from all leadership theories which say that leadership is a person's ability to influence the attitudes, beliefs and behavior of others.

State intelligence organizers consist of civil organizations, military, police, and a combination of the three. By arranging the height of rank and seniority sequentially from the highest level to the members, it is hoped that it can create stability in the coordination process between the three sources with different organizational types and cultures. The Head of BIN as chairman of Kominpus, currently held by the Police General, needs to add two positions as deputy chairman with a rank one level below who comes from civil and military. Likewise, if the Head of BIN comes from the military, then civil and police elements fill the deputy position, representing all three sources of intelligence. Likewise, the positions of secretary and daily executive chairman, apart from being filled by positions one level below the deputy chairman, should be filled by taking into account the heterogeneity factor.

This concept aims to ensure that recommendations issued by the Chairman of Kominpus and Chairman of Kominda in the administration of state intelligence can be immediately executed and followed up without any rejection or delay on the grounds that IC members have a higher rank and are more senior. This unique nature of military organizations does occur, so it needs to be understood and facilitated in the form of new policies that regulate the smooth flow of information and effectiveness in the coordination system.

Comparing Conceptual Models with Real World

The following comparison table contains activities in the conceptual model, real world conditions, recommendations for improvement, as well as an assessment of whether it meets the two criteria of systemically desirable and culturally feasible.

Table 6. Comparison between Conceptual models and real world.

Model	Real World Conditions	Systemically Desirable	Culturally Feasible
Alternative 1	Each member of the IC has a different interpretation of intelligence secrets and the classification of information, so they have different ways of limiting access rights, and do not have the same mechanism for imposing sanctions for failure to maintain intelligence secrets. Such conditions cause doubts and distrust between IC members in the information sharing process.	Yes	Yes
Alternative 2	The formation of a new institution needs strong reasons and background that explains its importance. Like Spain which democratized its intelligence in the process of transitioning from an authoritarian regime (Matei, García & Halladay, 2018). The structure and placement of intelligence organizations is also never standardized, according to user tastes and state needs. The condition of intelligence problems in Indonesia is not in a period of transition, emergency or war, so this transformation is not possible.	No	Yes
Alternative 3	IC members in Indonesia consist of civil and military intelligence, organizational leaders come from career and political paths. Discussions regarding the management of IC members based on height, rank and seniority are impossible to continue for reasons that are not culturally acceptable.	Yes	No

Alternative conceptual model 1 is considered the most practical because it only emphasizes the obligation to convey information to BIN as the IC coordinator in addition to implementing rewards and punishments, apart from not requiring a long time to change the policy regarding dualism reporting, the adjustments that need to be made are also relatively easy.

Alternative conceptual model 2 requires a long time to adjust to a new system under the coordination of a new institution. This model can be built during a government transition period that requires radical changes in the country's intelligence coordination system, or when the country's conditions are critical, or the country enters a war situation. This condition will eliminate institutional egos among IC members because the formation of new institutions is

based on the nature of serious threats and needs to be handled professionally, but at the same time the risk of disruption to the national security system may transform during this adjustment period and have an impact on weakening coordination between IC members.

Alternative conceptual model 3, apart from being practical, is also more resilient in mitigating the challenges of seniority culture, militaristic style, institutional ego and political dynamics (highly turnover position in political office), as well as demands for speed in sharing information. By regulating the height of rank and seniority, IC members will more easily obey the orders and recommendations of the IC coordinator, and eliminate the culture of seniority and militaristic style.

Conclusion

This article outlines four relevant issues requiring attention within Indonesia's intelligence coordination system: negative stigma surrounding information sharing, dual reporting, membership ambiguity, and low compliance. The conceptual development draws on the ideal conditions outlined in the national intelligence coordination policy, which aims to improve the performance and capabilities of the IC through integrated intelligence products.

This study formulates three alternative conceptual models that can be used as discussion material for improving Indonesia's national intelligence coordination system. The most feasible proposed transformation involves changing the policy to emphasize the importance of information sharing, clarity of the reporting system, membership composition, and the obligation to implement recommendations from the IC coordinator.

The critical challenge lies in ensuring that intelligence serves the public interest, rather than being exploited for partisan political agendas. Cultural diversity and the multi-threat landscape managed by multiple intelligence agencies further complicate implementation

Ethical Approval

This research underwent formal ethical review procedures for studies involving human subjects. Ethical approval was granted via Expedited Review under the Decree of the Chair of the Research Ethics Committee (Reference: S-011/UN2.F6.D2.LPM/PPM.KEP/IV/2025, dated 9 April 2025).

Informed Consent

Informed consent was obtained from all participants involved in the study, ensuring respect for confidentiality and voluntariness principles.

Declaration of Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest regarding the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. The material has not been published, in whole or in part, elsewhere and is not currently under consideration for publication in any other journal. All authors were personally and actively involved in the work that led to this article and take responsibility for its content. All ethical standards regarding the protection of study participants were met, in accordance with the World Medical Association's Declaration of Helsinki.

Funding

The author declares that he/she received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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