



From Knowledge Seeking to Ethical Action: The Elaboration of Taha Abdurrahman's Philosophy to Address Student's Information Overload

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Abstract

Rather than cultivating critical thinking, the ease of access to information in digital world, leads many students into confusion. By developing Taha Abdurrahman's theory of subject and Linda Zagzebski's intellectual virtues, this study aims to propose an onto-ethical approach to address students learning problem caused by information overload. Using library-based qualitative research, the authors compare and synthesis Taha's view on subject and Zagzebski's intellectual virtue to foster a critical-responsible digital subject. Tahaian notion of subject, which received ethico-spiritual commitment through transcendental encounter with God, is proposed as a resilient subject for information overload. Authors argue that to overcome information overload among students, the praxis of digital engagement must be altered from information seeking activity towards a responsible ethical action. To engage in digital activities is to responsibly executes certain intellectual virtues in order to do something ethical. The two-folded attributes of Tahaian subject: criticism and responsibility are essential in fostering an ethical-aware autonomous learner. Complementing this framework, this article engages through Linda Zagzebski's theory of intellectual virtues, to tackle digital-related pedagogical problems.

Introduction

The development of digital media, somehow, helped the access towards knowledge and education. From traditional knowledge sources, the digital media enables online knowledge production and dissemination through open access journals (Zriba, 2019; Ajani et al., 2024; Lewis et al., 2024). Moreover, through new forms of media facilitated by internet, everyone can learn everything from everywhere. Learning materials are available online, allowing students to study independently. On the one hand, it opens the door to the democratization of knowledge where knowledge sources that were concentrated in traditional educational institutions are now accessible to anyone. However, it opens up many challenges.

Knowledge dissemination using digital media proliferates digital gadget using. According to Jingwen, digital embedded teaching decrease students' initiative and virtual space decrease student's emotional interactivity (Jingwen, 2024). Reading on digital media also tends toward more shallow and superficial reading (Liao et al., 2024). Excessive internet use also leads to lesser attentional capacity and cognitive process (Firth et al., 2019; Benedetto et al., 2024), decision postponement (Desinta et al., 2025). From information overload, students may suffer fatigue and depression (Matthes et. all., 2020). Research on digital devices overdependence shows its relationship with digital dementia (Ali et al., 2024). Thus, what once intended to improve academic performance turned to be discouraging it (Wang et al., 2025).

In this context, what and how should students do to learn in effective way? Can the students rebuild his subjectivity amidst the information overload and learn? This article answers this question in positive way. However, it does not address this challenge through an intellectual or epistemological approach but involving ontological and ethical strategy. The lean towards strengthening students' subjectivity through instilling values, is essential in breaking the subjectivity dilemma in which digital technology put the students in (Jingwen, 2024) While it is expected that digital media improve student subjectivity with improved autonomy, initiative and creativity, the outcomes bring about opposite phenomenon.

The basic assumption of this approach is the interconnectedness of epistemology with ontology and ethics as proposed by Taha Abdurrahmane and many others. The process of acquiring knowledge could not be separated from the question of being and doing ethical action. It is obvious that Cartesian rationalism is solely based on existence of thinking being. It is also clear that in Aristotle thought, pursuing knowledge is the highest form of human virtue. Therefore, any flaws in knowledge inquiry must have some ontological and ethical explanation.

In the case of student's information overload problems, authors propose the elaboration of Taha Abdurrahman's theory of subject as a way out. Penulis berargumen bahwa teori subjek Taha Abdurrahman dapat dikembangkan untuk membentuk kepribadian siswa yang lebih adaptif dengan proliferasi informasi di era digital. In addition, Linda Zagzebski's theory of intellectual virtues is adopted to enrich the theoretical framework.

They are research intersect with the thesis and approach of this article. Comparison of Zagzebski's thought with Islamic thinker is conducted by Khazaei. He argued that Mulla Sadra address this issue of intellectual virtues better than Zagzebski does. Sadra, according Khazaei provided more comprehensive elaboration on human nature, knowledge acquisition, actions, and morality to base the subject formation (Khazaei, 2013, p. 37). While this difference subdues Zagzebski less comprehensive philosophy, her approach is more practical in addressing how ethics could help epistemological practices. This practicality is found in Taha Abdurrahman philosophy with his idea of fiqh falsafah. Taha argues that philosophy must complement its rational endeavor with practical and solution on real world problems (Abdurrahman, 1995).

Within this horizon of ethical guidance of epistemological practice, this article tries to revoke students subjectivism in the digital era. Zagzebski ideals, which stems up from Aristotle virtue ethics, argues for new direction in epistemology that regard knowledge beyond the theory of justification. It connects the action of knowledge inquiry with agent's virtuous character. Knowledge, according to her, is an act of intellectual virtue in contact with reality (Zagzebski, 1996, p. xv)

In the context of ethics in digital era, some thinkers argue for the compatibility of virtue ethics in the digital era. Rusnak and Seals proposes the human flourishing as the orientation of development and utilization of technologies (Rusnak & Seals, 2025) However, while admitting AI harm on numbing subjective decision, Rusnak and Seals overstates the possibility of future machine increasing capacity of virtues. Instead of arguing for such, this research emphasizes on the subjective reinstatement through the reinstalment of responsibility in subjects. Both Taha's and Zagzebski's positions revolve around this assumption.

Methods

This study is based on the qualitative philosophical investigation and aims at examining the ethical and ontological aspects of interaction between students and digital information. Instead of taking information overload as an issue of technical or psychological issue, the study places

it in the context of more general questions about subjectivity, responsibility and intellectual character. As such, the research paper takes on a conceptual and interpretative stance, which enables the profound involvement of normative theories and philosophical arguments, in an attempt to re-establish significant relationships between the processes of epistemology, ethical devotion, and the construction of learning subjects in the age of digitality.

The main sources of this paper are the major works of philosophy by Taha Abdurrahman and Linda Zagzebski. These works were chosen as they provide organised and extensive statements of moral individuality and intelligent virtue as part of their own traditions. The writings by Taha give a structure of the formation of subjects based on the concepts of responsibility and transcendental commitment, whereas writings by Zagzebski present an elaborate description of epistemic virtues and moral responsibility in the pursuit of knowledge. Besides these main sources, the research extensively refers to the current academic sources of the literature on digital education, virtue epistemology, information overload, and philosophical anthropology. These secondary sources do not just serve to support the inquiry but act as the critical interlocutors that assist in the process of locating the current inquiry within the current scholarly discussions.

Data gathering was done by means of regular and close reading of pertinent materials and supported by a systematic note taking of the main concepts, arguments and theoretical stances. Readings that express the ideas of questioning, responsibility, motivation, virtue and moral agency were given specific focus. These materials were slowly grouped into thematic clusters which not only indicated the inner workings of each philosophical system but also indicated how it could apply to the modern issues of education. This stage of reading and recording was not addressed as a pre-technical stage but it was part of the interpretative process by which a conceptual meaning was increasingly defined.

Based on this textual basis, the work involves the use of the philosophical hermeneutics as the main line of analysis. Every text was read in its historical, intellectual and argumentative context in order to prevent reductive or decontextualized interpretations. The research attempted to identify convergences as well as tensions between Taha Abdurrahman ethical anthropology and responsibilist epistemology of Zagzebski through recurring cycles of close reading, comparison and reflective interpretation. This dialogical action enabled various levels of thought to meet each other and this dialogue made it possible to come up with new levels of understanding of interpretation which could not be attained under each of the two frameworks individually.

Conceptual analysis was also applied alongside the hermeneutic interpretation, to discuss the inner coherence and normative implications of the major theoretical categories that were used in this study. The ideas like subjectivity, responsibility, virtue and knowledge practice have been rebuilt and analyzed with great care concerning their assumptions and practical implications. This analytical writing enabled the shift in descriptive exposition to critical approach to the philosophical underpinnings of the digital learning practices. In the process, the research clarified how the ethical orientations determine the cognitive behavior, and the intellectual virtues as the guiding principles in the sophisticated informational surroundings.

The last phase of the study involves normative reconstruction, whereby the interpretative results are incorporated in a comprehensible theoretical model. This research derives the ontological ethical framework of responsible digital subjectivity based on the comparative and analytical work to redefine the learning activities as morally responsible practices. Digital engagement is therefore seen not just as information seeking behavior but as a mode of ethical action which is geared towards intellectual integrity and social responsibility. This framework

is aimed at providing a reflective option to the purely instrumental ways of approaching digital education.

The legitimacy of the offered framework is determined by the long-term interaction with the authoritative philosophical foundations, the critical discussion of the available literature, and the ongoing review of the interpretative decisions in a form of reflexivity. Instead of basing its argument on statistical generalization, the research attempts to prove its plausibility by consistency in theory, rigor in argument, and transparency in the process of analysis. By so doing, the study hopes to play a significant role in the philosophical and pedagogical debates that abound with questions about how learners can develop responsible varieties of learning in a very complicated digital world.

Results and Discussion

Students Problem in The Digital Era: Information Overload

The recent development of digital technology helps to create the information and communication technology where there is systemic integration and interconnection of information and communication through digital media. However, the massive amount of information presents students with information overload, where the limited cognitive ability fails to integrate the available information into meaningful comprehension (Shahrzadi et al., 2024). Information overload is defined as a condition where the number of information is so overwhelming that someone is unable to utilize it (Adekoya & Akune, 2023)

As the impact, overwhelmed by the information, students start losing their attention and are suffering negative emotions (Aadland & Heinström, 2024). Research from (Tafesse et al., 2024) also shows that information overload causes some psychological strains in students such as technostress and exhaustion. Further, this psychological exhaustion affects students' learning productivity (Putri & Pinandito, 2024). The more detail account is given by (Wang et al., 2025) that correlates information overload with mental fatigue, and shows that such fatigue improves cognitive depletion, decreases student's concentration ability and information processing.

Much research suggests the solution for the problem. In the individual level, much research suggests the behavioural solution such as development of ICT competency and time management for individuals (Arnold et al., 2023). However, the same article also shows that more systemic interventions are being proposed to tackle the information overload. It is also what (Shahrzadi et al., 2024) argues for the holistic approach.

While this article does not reject the overall comprehensive solution, authors argue that this general approach neglects the more fundamental problems, that is the ontological and ethical aspect of cognitive process. Research suggests practical solutions forget the philosophical question of knowledge inquiry that is subjective being who does the process.

Subject of Learning in The Era Digital Era

Research on subjectivity is essential in education. According to Biesta, subjectivity is an important aspect of educational aims (Segev, 2024). It gains more importance in the digital era, not only because it is often neglected in the discussion of digital education orientation, but because it is the possible palliative of digital era pathology. All this time, the focus that attracts attention of the digital world, especially in the field of education, revolves around what material should be taught (digital media, data mining, artificial intelligence), and what is the effective pedagogical strategy to develop the digital education (adaptive technology, deep learning, internet of things). This tendency represents what Wulf said as the anthropocentric attitude of digitalization that aims to strengthen human control over nature (Wulf, 2019).

Within those such dominant discourse, the subject suffers functional degradation. Subjects are no longer viewed as persons, but as a bundle of interconnected digital activities and profiles (Goriunova, 2019a). This idea arises from the underlying assumption that subject is the epicentre of knowledge. Its origin could be traced back to Cartesian rationality which finds its basis from self-reflection. As onto-epistemic entity which infers subjective construction through epistemic activity, the very existence of subject become indeterminate when epistemic activities do not perform. According to Wulf, anthropocentric intrusion to digital world is an extension of modernity project which place human on the foundation of egocentrism, logocentrism and ethnocentrism (Wulf, 2019). In contrast to this view, Taha's subject is an ethical subject born of a transcendental primordial contract with God (Abdurrahman, 2017, p. 17). From this onto-ethical activity, the subject's epistemic attributes emerge, namely knowledge of the Divine Names, which are the source of ethical values.

The problem of western modernity, according to Taha, is the eventual reversal of any initial intention. This is precisely what we observe in the ongoing process of digitalization. When it aims to reinforce human egocentrism by domination over nature, the process results in degrading subjectivity into mere digital traces. Moreover, when digitalization seeks to advance the logocentric humanism, as in the mastery of information and knowledge, information overload paradoxically decreases human ability to comprehend. Therefore, the weight of research on learning subject in the digital era assumes significant as foundational premise to a needed social engineering, that is the revitalization of subjective enactivism (Goriunova, 2019a; Macgilchrist, 2018).

There is interesting definition of subject by Goriunova that regards digital subject in the framework of distance (Goriunova, 2019b). What Goriunova refers to as distance is a set of possibilities that construct subject beyond biological or psychological identity and beyond digital data. This distance encompasses certain aspects such as spiritual calling, passion, and knowledge that enable subject to become enactive. This idea is crucial for regarding digital subject not as passive and determined entity, but as something that has potentiality for growth and make future trajectories. While such idea opens up the possibility toward the role of value in the development of digital subject, Goriunova did not explicitly elaborate this matter further. Therefore, this paper argues that ethical values, whether expressed in the form of virtues, religious moralities or others, are also essential in the formation of digital subject. For this reason, the appeal to Taha Abdurrahman and Linda Zagzebski becomes relevant in addressing the problem of subjectivity in the digital age.

Taha Abdurrahman's Theory of Subject

In his critique of Western philosophy, Taha rejects the definition of philosophy as inquiry, as in the Aristotelian tradition, or as critique, as in the modern critical tradition. For him, these two cognitive engagements overlook a fundamental intrinsic dimension of any philosophical practice, namely responsibility (Taha, 2006: 15). This is because, in essence, a philosopher's inquiry or critique actually represents a sense of responsibility that drives him to ask questions. Therefore, an inquiry or critique is not simply directed at others to answer the question, but rather a reflective engagement, a process through which the questioner personally implicated with the problem under scrutiny.

From this critique, the author concludes two important dimensions of subjectivity: al-sualiyyah (questioning) and al-mas'uliyah (responsibility). The al-su'aliyyah dimension subsumes two Western philosophical activities: inquiry and criticism. Meanwhile, the al-mas'uliyah dimension is the aspect of responsibility related to ethical values. Within Taha's framework,

these ethics refer to religious values. (Taha, 2022). The author visualizes this concept in the following chart:




Figure 1. The Concept of Subject Elaborated from Taha Abdurrahman Critique of Western Philosophy.

These two dimensions are intertwined and inseparable, as Taha's theoretical framework develops a holistic relationship between all elements. From a traditional Islamic perspective, the subject is usually depicted as passive, as someone who submits to religious teachings. This is not entirely wrong, but it also needs correction. In the creed of Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah, the subject is not depicted as a full fatalist, it still possesses an activism dimension in the form of *kasb/ikhtiyar*. The evidence for this is Surah Al-Baqarah, verse 286.

In the theoretical framework developed by the author from Taha's thinking, the subject is not merely passive but possesses a *su'aliyah* dimension. This is because, fundamentally, humans themselves are created through a relational discursive process, or what Taha calls *talaqqi al-su'al wa al-ittishal al-awwal* (Taha, 2022: 129). Here, Taha interpret the event described in the Qur'an in Surah al-A'raf, verse 172. In this verse, God is depicted asking and demanding human testimony, "Am I your Lord?" Humans answer, "Yes, we bear witness." As a result of this transcendental discursive process, a primordial agreement was born between humans that brought with it the second dimension, namely *al-mas'uliyah*.

This second dimension receives significant attention in Taha's thought because it is the central tenet of his general theoretical framework. While the first dimension represents the similarities between Taha's thought and Western thought in general, this second dimension is the distinct point that makes his thinking unique. Of course, besides Taha, other Islamic thinkers have also voiced the urgency of ethics. Figures such as Muhammad Qutb and Alija Izitbegovich have also stated that morality is what distinguishes humans from animals (Suleiman, 2020, p. 8). Meanwhile, with a different conceptualization, Naquib Al Attas criticized Western thought through the concept of *adab*, a notion deeply imbued with ethical and moral significance (Rakhmat, 2023, p. 136).

Ethics is indeed a fundamental dimension of Islamic teachings. A hadith narrated by Bukhari states that the Prophet Muhammad was sent to perfect morality. Taha interprets this hadith in two ways. First, ontologically, "*itmam al-akhlaq*" means that Islam perfects the ethical deficiencies found in previous ethical systems. Second, epistemologically, that is, perfection in the sense of a broader explanation of most ethical values (Taha, 2022: 373).

The two dimensions of Taha's subjectivity mentioned above, criticism and responsibility, must be understood within the broader context of Taha's critique western philosophical anthropology

and its underlying human conception. For Taha, what differentiate human humans from animals is not their rationality, but their action. With this view, Taha criticizes the logos that serve as the centripetal of the Western philosophical paradigm. Humans are creatures who act within a specific ethical framework; therefore, the defining element of humanity is ethos, not logos. Accordingly, the aforementioned dimensions of Taha's subjectivity must be viewed within the framework of ethos. The dimensions of *sualiyyah* and *mas'uliyah* are not logocentrism that revolves around symbolic-linguistic debates, but rather relate to ethical frameworks and actions.

In Taha's framework, questionness and responsibility are inseparable and represents two dimensions of self. By criticizing the negative freedom, Taha endorse a more active freedom where subject embody internal qualities to exert self-mastery over internal impulses (Taha, 2016: 127). To present questionness without responsibility would make the subject fall short into the concept of philosophical rationality that Taha condemned. In the other hand, to emphasize only on responsibility would make the subject of apollonian ethics.

Linda Zagzebski's Epistemic Virtues

Epistemic virtues theory is part of virtue epistemology movement ideas. Essentially, this movement shifted the epistemological focus from the study of the properties of beliefs to the intellectual traits of knowledge agents. Initially, this theory was born to transcend the foundationalism versus coherentism epistemological debate that ignored the ethical dimension. Ernest Sosa transformed justification theory from a question of the structure of knowledge to a question of knowing agents (Batak, 2016). This shift in focus does not mean that virtue epistemology annuls the justification of truth but rather places it as part of the framework of the knowing agent's virtuous actions. Therefore, epistemology no longer only discusses truth and its justification, but also includes the teleological dimension of an agent's actions. The emergence of virtue epistemology is also an attempt to provide an answer to the Gettier problem, which questions knowledge as justified true belief. By emphasizing the agent's reliable faculty or character, reasoning based on luck cannot be viewed as knowledge (Umbers, 2004).

Among virtue epistemologists, there are two main branches with differing views on which aspects of the agent constitute the basis for the justification of knowledge. Reliabilists, such as Sosa, believe that it is the agent's cognitive processes and faculties that enable knowledge to be reliably justified (Zagzebski & De Paul, 2007: 2), on the other hand, the responsibilist places the character of the agent as the basis for evaluating knowledge, not only a mere justification (Fairweather & Zagzebski, 2001: 3; Pratama, 2008). Despite these differences, the normative tendencies of virtue epistemology make it different from the naturalist school of epistemology developed by Quine (Quine, 1969). Zagzebski still claims virtue epistemology as naturalism, but in the sense that the values of virtue are always related to the way humans are constructed by nature (Fairweather & Zagzebski, 2001, p. 5)

This school of virtue epistemology draws inspiration from Aristotle's virtue ethics, which shifts the focus from moral action to the agent. However, Zagzebski disagrees with Aristotle, who views intellectual values as taught and moral values as acquired through practice and imitation (Umbers, 2013: 273). For her, intellectual virtues and moral values are not separated. This interrelation implies that intellectual failures may arise as a consequence of moral vices.

In the responsibleist view, virtue cannot be simply a quality or process independent of the agent. Virtues relate to subjective dimensions such as motivation (Khazaei, 2013, p. 23). In this context, epistemic virtues are not limited to cognitive skills, but also include technical skills,

talents and qualities (Pratama, 2008: 171). Virtues are not skills, power, natural ability or habit. It is a prolonged acquired excellence of a person involving motivation to aim certain ends (Khazaei, 2013, p. 24). Therefore, Zagzebski distinguishes between intellectual skills and intellectual virtues.

Table 1. Intellectual Skills and Intellectual Virtues According to Linda Zagzebski (Zagzebski, 1996).

Intellectual skills	Intellectual virtues
Verbal skills	Sensitivity to details
Perceptual acuity skills	Open-mindedness
Logical skills	Fairness in evaluating others' argument
Explanatory skills	Intellectual humility
Mathematical skills	Intellectual perseverance
Mechanical skills	Adaptability of intellect
	The detective's virtue
	Being able to recognize authority
	Insight into persons, problems, theories
	The teaching virtues

This distinction is based on their different motivational dimensions. Intellectual skills are neutral and can be used for both good and bad purposes, while intellectual virtues are related to the process of forming self-identity and achieving eudaimonia. Zagzebski also distinguishes virtues from power or natural ability because a person is not judged as good or bad simply because they possess power. This differs from virtues, where a person will be praised for having virtues.

As the name suggests, responsibilist virtue ethics, Zagzebski put the intellectual dimension as the object of ethical responsibility. In his view, not only external actions are the agent's responsibility, but also beliefs, which are the fundamental components of knowledge. Thus, Zagzebski makes knowledge the object of ethics. Humans are responsible for their beliefs because they can be controlled. Knowledge is not something that simply comes to us but something we acquire through effort and skill. (Zagzebski, 1996, p. 261).

Taha Abdurrahman Meets Linda Zagzebski

For Taha, the way out of the limitations of pure reason is through practical values (*qiyam al-amaliyah*). Actions is nurturing and nursing rational practices (Abdurrahman, 2020, p. 68). I argue that this is the point where Taha and Linda thought collide. For rationality, in Taha's framework, requires orientation principles that guides its direction. This guide in Linda philosophy is intellectual virtues.

Taha does not discuss such virtues, because he rejects as false the choice among values. In fact, for Taha, questionness and responsibility is principles of rational activity rather than virtues. Yet, we may, nonetheless, treat questionness and responsibility as virtues in the sense that Taha may support, the ideal traits that should govern rational endeavor. For in Taha's understanding, there must be internal values as forms of ethical governance (Abdurrahman, 2016, p. 127).

One may object that virtue epistemology is totally different with that of Tahaian approach on the basis that virtue epistemologist does not tackle the issue of practice outside rational pursuit. However, while it considers values of rational practice as epistemological concern and not the matter of justification, it may fall to the category of action in Tahaian terms. Taha explicitly situates reflective action within the overall domain of his practical ethics (Abdurrahman, 2020,

p. 15). It is also worth to notice that Zagzebski did consider intellectual evaluation as moral evaluation (Pouivet, 2010, p. 4).

It is true that virtue epistemology is epistemology in the sense that it run towards knowledge, while Taha's project is ethics which is after the idea of righteous act. However, responsibilists were shifting the locus of knowledge evaluation from justification to an act of intellectual virtue (Fairweather & Zagzebski, 2001, p. 4). So, the virtue epistemology is as normative as Taha's ethics.

The similiarity goes on the focus on agent. Virtue epistemology is definitely agent-centered, for it leave the old-paradigm of belief evaluation process toward more analysis on human traits to obtain the truth (Khazaei, 2013, p. 22). The centrality of agent is also of Taha's philosophy. Hallaq argues that the whole Taha philosophy revolves around the revival of positively free subject who refuse the imposition of external category for subjecthood (Hallaq, 2019, p. 261). Moving from this central, Taha's project extends into the wider scope as he subsumes all dimensions of human life, including politics, under the principle of ethics. Politics here is not understood as institutional management of society, but as the interconnectedness of humanity dimensions. Regarding this, Taha's philosophy is different from that of virtue epistemology.

Virtue epistemology remains epistemology even if it tries to go beyond traditional interpretation of it and works on more connection with ethics. However, all that Zagzebski does is trying to construct epistemological theory that modeled on virtue ethics (Zagzebski, 2020, p. 1). According to her, virtue epistemology is naturalistic in the sense that virtues relate to the way human being is constructed by nature (Fairweather & Zagzebski, 2001, p. 5). There are some indications in Zagzebski writings that seem like she treated epistemology as ethics, for example:

The relationship between the evaluation of cognitive activity and the evaluation of acts in the overt sense usually reserved to ethics is more than an analogous one. I will argue that the intellectual virtues are so similar to the moral virtues in Aristotle's sense of the latter that they ought not to be treated as two different kinds of virtue. It follows that intellectual virtue is properly the object of study of moral philosophy. This claim is intended . . . to extend the range of moral concepts to include the normative dimension of cognitive activity. . . . If I am right normative epistemology is a branch of ethics. Either discipline ignores the other at its peril (Zagzebski, 1996, pp. xiv–xv).

This passage is elaborated by Pouivet as evidence of Zagzebksi's assuming epistemology as ethics. He latter works on extensive arguments to disprove it (Pouivet, 2010). However, what Pouivet failed to understand is that Zagzebski only intended to extend ethical inquiry into normative dimension of cognitive activity. It does not mean that intelligent persons are always morally virtuous as Pouivet problematized, it only means that intelligent persons do have morally virtuous traits.

Toward The Construction of Responsible Digital Subject in Learning

From the subject theory above, how is this relevant to students' personality development in the face of digital challenges? In responsible virtue epistemology, virtues can be embodied, so they don't have to involve active and deliberative monitoring of every knowledge acquisition process. These embodied virtues will guide the process of tacit knowledge seeking (Rothenfluch, 2015). This has significant implication for student engagement in the digital age. Students who have developed intellectual virtues will conduct their knowledge-seeking process in a guided and goal-directed manner.

By placing learning within the framework of intellectual responsibility, challenges in the process can be identified and therefore mitigated. The first challenge is akrasia, a weak desire to do what one knows is the right thing to do. The second challenge is how, in the process of seeking knowledge, an agent chooses virtues and ignores vices. On the one hand, an agent has the potential for virtues, but also within him or her the potential for vices. Vices such as intellectual pride, negligence, idleness, cowardice, conformity, carelessness, rigidity, prejudice, wishful thinking, close-mindedness, insensitivity to detail, obtuseness, and lack of thoroughness can hinder the process of seeking knowledge (Umbers, 2013: 274). This is where Taha's theory of the subject becomes relevant, by placing responsibility as one of the basic elements of the subject's constitution, Taha directs the subject to embody virtues instead of vices.

An important point arises from Taha's framework: he rejects virtue ethics tradition that designates eudaimonia as the highest virtue. Within the context of digital engagement, the author aligns with Taha's opinion that the proper orientation of ethics is action. Human beings, according to this view, are agents who act within a specific ethical framework, both in the form of material and mental actions. This view is more appropriate in addressing the negative impacts of digital activities than eudaimonic model. Because, in this context, eudaimonia is often reduced to eudemonic experience rather than eudemonic motivation (Daneels et al., 2023). In such a context, the impact of eudaimonia is often limited to the scope of gaming and entertainment and ignores the impact in the real world.

With an orientation towards eudemonia solely as virtual self-actualization, digital activities can easily fall into negative impacts. Research from Bandjar (Bandjar, 2022) shows that this can happen because the digital world facilitates complex eudaimonic experiences of cognitive, affective and social gratification. Oliver et al. all say that this gratification is different from hedonic gratification with its character as expressiveness rather than just happiness (Oliver et al., 2018, p. 382). The problem with this theory is that, while it transcends hedonic goals, it remains inward-oriented, not outward-oriented, which assumes interconnectedness between the self and others. Therefore, the author rejects Aristotelian eudemonic as an orientation for implementing intellectual virtues in the digital world.

Thus, the collision of Taha Abdurrahman theory of subject and Linda Zagzebski's theory of intellectual virtues could help students overcoming digital world challenges. By putting responsibility as the core of digital engagement, students could pass information overload as a consequence of information-seeking activity. Taha's subject reiterates that subjective duty, and Linda's theory elucidates certain traits that subjects have to embody in order to be responsible digital subject.

Conclusion

Theoretically, the elaboration of Taha Abdurrahman two-folded dimensions of subjectivity with Linda Zagzebski's responsibilist theory of intellectual virtues could be proposed to overcome learning paralysis caused by information overload in the digital world. By changing the orientation of digital engagement from information seeking to responsible action, students may avoid confuse and indecisiveness. This theoretical research could be further developed by empirical studies in the future. Further philosophical inquiry should also be taken to deepen the analysis of the nature of learning revealed by the findings.

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